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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ASPEN ACRES ASSOCIATION,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SEVEN ASSOCIATES, INC.,
a Corpora tion,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
12825

Brief of Defendant-Appellant
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action in which respondent (plaintiff below) an association of owners of lots within a subdivision
sought to obtain title to the water system serving the
subdivision and an easement across lands of defendant
(appellant herein) in connection with the road system
leading to and within the subdivision.

DISPOSITION OF LO,VER COURT
The Lower Court ordered defendant to convey the
water system and its components to plaintiff, and permitted plaintiff the right to enter upon the roads and
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"immediately adjacent hmcl" (of the clefendants) to
maintain and imprm'e the roads arnl restrict access thereto, and further imposed upon defendant the obligation
to guarantee the performance of plaintiff's duties toward the members of plaintiff Association.

RELIEF SOFtaIT ON APPEAL
Uefendant seeks a partial reversal of the judgment
awarded to plaintiff against the defendant insofar as
the judgment awards title of the water system to plaintiff (a11d other matters arising therefrom) and insofar
as the judgme11t grants plaintiff the right to control
the access to the property, and insofar as the judgment
requires defendant to guarantee the duties which the
plaintiff Association owes to its members.

STA'l'El\IE:N"T OF FACTS
This action concerns rights of the various parties in
a parcel of property known as "Aspen Acres" more
fully described as the East 1h of Section 27, Township
1 North, Range 7 East, S. L.B.&l\I., which is situated
in Summit County, State of Utah, containing 320 acres.
Prior to the obtaining of any interest in that real property by any party to this law suit, title thereto was vested
in Aspen . .L\cres Inc. Aspen Acres Inc. was a Utah corporation organized for profit whose stock was owned by
:l\Iax Bateman ( 50%), who se1Te<l as president, and J.
Reed Tuft ( 50%) who served as secretary. :Mr. Tuft

3

also served as attorney for Aspen Acres Inc. during the
entire existence of the corporation ( R. 330). On l\Iay
7, 1962, Aspen Acres Inc. had commenced the development of a mountain home subdivision comprising 150
lots of approximately one-half acre each. In order to
avoid confusion, Aspen Acres Inc. (which is not a party
to this action) will be refeITed to as "the Developer."
Aspen Acres Association (plaintiff herein) will be referred to as "the Association" or "Plaintiff".
The subdivision thus formed by the Developer was
isolated from the public road by a strip of land (comprising approximately 100 acres) owned by the Developer, hut each contract by which lots within the subdivision
were sold contained the following language: "The seller
agrees to share water from unnamed spring and pipe
to tract. The seller guarantees right-of-way to and from
property. The seller reserves right-of-way for construction and maintenance of pipeline and power transmission lines."
Originally, access to the subdivision was provided
over adjoining land owned by a l\1r. Stillman. But some
time in 1961 the point of access was changed to its
present location, which is over land then owned by the
Developer.
In creating the subdiYision, the Developer did not
reserve title to the streets within the subdivision, but
di,~ided the lots so that each lot went to the center of
the street. Each conveyance of a lot expressly reserved
a right-of-way in the streets" .... for the use and bene-
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fit of any person now owning or who may acquire property in the tract krnrn n as Aspen Acres." (Exhibits IO,
18, IO and 28.)
On or about August :W, I962, a meeting was held
at the I-Iotel Utah for the purpose of forming a nonprofit organi:wtion for the mvners of property in Aspen
Acres. A written notice of the meeting signecl by l\lax
l3ateman was sent to all lot owners (R. I8I). A copy
of the notice was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 3.
After stating the time and place of the meeting, the
notice said: "At this time we will want to elect officers
and discuss the advisability of keeping the road to the
area accessable during the winter months. Other matters that should he discussed are garbage service, maintenance of roads and water lines." (Exhibit a).
At the meeting l\lax llateman introduced his attorney David Salisbury who displayed some articles
and by-laws for the formation of a non-profit corporation ( H. 2I I). l\Ir. Salisbury further explained that the
reason for the formation of the association was that
Bateman was leaving the area and intended to divorce
himself from the responsibilities of maintaining the
water system and roads; that he was turning the whole
thing ewer to the Association for which the Association
woulcl he responsible ( R. 2I2).
The Articles of Incorporation of Aspen Acres Association, a non-profit corporation, (plaintiff and respondent herein) were filed in the office of the Secre-
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tary of State of the State of Utah on September 12,
1962. (See Exhibit 9 containing the Aiticles, By-Laws
and l\Iinutes of plaintiff Association.) On October 30,
1HG2, a meeting of the Board of Directors of the plaintiff Association was held at which "It was the consensus
that we [the Association] should secure a commitment
from l\Ir. Bateman as to how much water and what
rights he intends to convey to the Association .... " (Exhibit 9-See l\Ii1mtes of .1\Ieeting October 30, 1962).
At the direction of the Board of Directors, Kenneth
L. Stahr as president of the Association wrote a leth:~
to .Max Bateman on November 2, 1962, in which he
stated that the Association desired to know what water
rights l3ateman intended to transfer. A copy of this letter was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 14.
On or about January 25, 1963, the Developer corporation and .1\Iax Bateman individually, jointly and
se\'erally deeded to the plaintiff Association certain
water rights described in a written "Agreement of
Transfer" which was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 13. The exhibit stated as follows: "These water
rights and [water] stock certificates are executed and
delivered to Aspen Acres Associated for the benefit of
those persons and corporations now owning lots in Aspen
Acres Incorporated Subdivision, and for the benefit of
those who may hereafter own land therein. Said water
rights shall be distributed to said beneficiaries in accordance with the Articles of the Association of the
grantee."

Th clefe11dant corporation was formed in l\Iarch,
1!Hi3, as the culmination of about four months of negotiations. These negotiations started when one of the lot
owners ('\Talton Farmer) found out that the Developer
intended to sell out its remaining interests to a group of
people from Phoenix.
l\I r. Farmer first proposed that the Association buy
the property from the Developer. ( ll. 288.) \,Vhen this
was refused, l\[r. Farmer tried to interest all lot owners
in the purchase. ( ll. 287, 288.) Finally, seven lot owners
got together awl formed Seven Associates, Inc. (def encla11t and appellant herein.) ( R. 288.) Harold G.
Blumenthal was elected president of the defendant an<l
Kenneth L. Stahr (the same person who was the president of the plaintiff Association) was elected secretary.
l\Ir. Stahr continued to act in this dual capacity until
l\Iay, 1H67. (.Exhibit 9.)
On or about l\Iarcl1 27, 1963, the Developer corporation entered into a contract with the clefendant by the
terms of which defendant purchased from the Developer, for the sum of $10~3,000.00, the lands remaining undeveloped in the said one-half section, and eighteen lots
within the subdivision owned by the Developer. A copy
of the Purchase Agreement was admitted into evidence
as .Exhibit IG. By the terms of the Contract of Sale,
the Developer specifically agreed to sell to the def endant " ... all water systems and any development in connection with such water systems appurtenant to said real
estate.... " '1.'he defendant also specifically assumed the
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liability and responsibility with respect to the water
system for the purpose of running lines to fifteen lots
specifically identified in the contract (four of which lots
were included in the group purchased by defendant).
The contract then provided: "The above liabilities to be
incurred by buyer [defendant] are to be limited to the
above lots." (See Exhibit 16, Paragraph 4.)
In the years intervening bewteen .l\1arch 27, 1963,
and the present date, both plaintiff Association and the
defendant have expended sums of money to maintain
J
the roads leading to aucl throughout the subdivision an(1
also to maintain the water system. Defendant also
sought to subdivide some of the undeveloped acreage
a<ljoining the subdivision, but disputes developed over
water when defendant connected its newly developed
subdivision into the existing water system. Over the
years there have been negotiations between plaintiff and
defendant with respect to the use of the water system,
and the sufficiency of the water rights and questions
have arisen between them as to the persons intended to
be benefitted by the conveyance of water rights to the
plaintiff Association.
Plaintiff took the position that membership in the
Association and beneficial use of the water rights conveyed to it should be restricted to the owners of those
lots which were in existence on September 12, 1962,
whereas defendant took the position that any person
who became the owner of property situated within the
one-half section tract was entitled to become a member
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of the Association upon payment of dues and could
share in the water rights to the extent water was availahle. In this action, the Lower Court held that member~hip was available to anyone owning property within
the one-half section tract, but that water should he made
available to members of the Association on a priority
basis established by the dates of their purchase of property within the tract. Neither party has appealed from
these holdings.
The Court also held, however, that the plaintiff
Association was entitled to the ownership of the water
system (based upon an Agreement dated .l\Iay 22, 1963,
which was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 15), and
also that the plaintiff Association had the right to restrict access and otherwise control the rights of all property owners in the one-half section tract to the use of
existing roads not only within the subdivision but also
outside of the subdivided areas. The Court failed to
make any finding with respect to an issue raised by defernlant's counterclaim that it was entitled to an easement in common with the other property owners over the
roads within the subdi,·ision in order to gain access to
defendant's land lying beyond the subdivision. The
Court further imposed upon the defendant the burden
of guaranteeing all of the duties which the plaintiff
Association owes to its members. Defendant appealed
from all of these latter determinations.

STATEl\IENT OF POINTS
POIN1' I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION OvVNS THE
ATER SYSTEl\I,
STORAGE TANKS, CONDUITS AND 11\1PROVEl\IENTS, IN FINDING THAT EXHIBIT 1.5 IS A VALID CONTRACT, AND IN
RESTRAINING DEFENDANT FROl\I l\IAKING ANY ATTACI-11\IENTS TO OR l\IODIFICATIONS OF THE
ATER SYSTEl\I.

'v

''r

POIN1' II. THE COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION THE RIGHT TO CONTROL THE
EASEMENTS WITHIN AND \VITHOUT
THE SUBDIVISION, AND IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN
EASEl\IENT ACROSS THE ROADS WITHIN
THE SUBDIVISION FOR ACCESS TO ITS
LANDS OWNED BY DEI~'ENDANT.
POINT III. TI-IE COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING TI-I AT DEFENDANT :MUST
GUARANTEE THE DUTIES \VHICH THE
PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION OWES TO ITS
l\IEl\IBERS, AND IN ESTOPPING DEFENDANT FROlH DENYING THAT THE PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION IS ITS AGENT.

]()

AHGUl\IENT
POIX1' 1. THE TRIAL COURT ElUlED
IX IIOLDING TIIAT TIIE PLAINTIFI•-. ASSOC IATIOX U\VNS TIIE 'VA'l'ER SYSTEl\1,
STOHAGE TANKS, CONDUITS AND Il\IPROVEl\IENTS, IN FINDING THAT EXlillHT 15 IS A VALID CONTRACT. AND IN
RESTHAIXING DEFENDANT FROl\I l\IAKING ANY ATTACJil\IEXTS TO OR l\IODIFICATIOXS OF THE 'V ATER SYSTEl\I.
In its Complaint, pl:mtiff claimed only an easement for repair awl maintenance of the 'vater system.
After the trial, however, the Association ma<le the claim
that "Plaintiff's witnesses testified, that from the beginning, the Developer promised to conVc,1/ the water
systc m (together with easements of access) to the Association in consideration of the Association's undertaking to maintain it and assure its continued operability."
( H. 117.) (Emphasis added.) No such evidence exists
in the record. Three witnesses called by the plaintiff
testified as to the organization meeting of the plaintiff
.Association (at which this promise allegedly was ma<le.
R. 15().) Parley Pike, plaintiff's witness, testified
that Bateman's lawyer stated that I3ateman desired to
form the group " ... to take over the maintenance and
operation of the roads and the water system, keeping
them in good repair, and to do other domestic duties
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such as garbage collection ... " (R. 182.) (Emphasis
ad<led.)
Charles 1\1. Neve (plaintiff's witness) stated that
those present at the organization meeting of the plaintiff Association were told by lVIr. Jfateman " ... Once
the Association is formed I can then turn over the
water rights . ... " (R. 196.) (Emphasis added.)
Paul .J. Carpenter (plaintiff's witness and president of the plaintiff Association at the time of trial)
testified that at the organization meeting,
Bateman's ah..__
torney, David Salisbury, did the talking and that he said
Bateman ". . . had heretofore been maintaining the
water system, he had been doing all things connected
with the water. He had put in the roads. Problems in
connection with the roads and access from the highway,
that he had assumed the responsibility for that. That he
was now divorcing himself from those responsibilities,
and he was turning the whole thing over to the Association for which they would be responsible .... " (R. 211,

:,

212.)

No other witness testified as to the organization
meeting of the Association and specifically no witness
testified nor was there other evidence introduced (except Exhibit 15 which will be discussed later) which
showed that Bateman, the Developer corporation, or
the defendant corporation had ever promised to convey
the water system to the Association.
The invitation which Bateman sent to the lot own-

12

crs i1ffitir1g them to attend the organization meeting of
the corporation did not contain any promise to convey
the water system to the Association, hut stated that
mai11tc11a11cc of water lines would be discussed. (Exhibit :3.)
The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors and members of the plaintiff Association (Exhibit n) also indicate that no representation was ever
made to the effect Bateman would convey the water
s.11stcm (as opposed to the water rights) to the Association.
The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors dated February 8, 1963, disclose the following:
"The purpose of this meeting was to discuss
the water situation at Aspen Acres and to examine the water rights which had been transferred to us from .l\Iax Bateman and Aspen
. Acres, Inc. The water problem was discussed
at great length and the water rights and titles
were accepted as transferred. A motion was
made, seconded and unanimously carried:

UESOL \rED: The water rights as received are now accepted as transferred to us
with thanks to l\Iax Bateman for giving us
these rights.

* * * * *

"It was su ggcstcd that we also secure from
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1llr. Bateman a transfer of title of his interest
in the present water system and any future
water system that he could install in this area."
(R. 131.) (Emphasis added.)

Thus, it is uncontroverted and clearly established
by the evidence presented by plaintiff that the directors of the plaintiff Association knew at or about the
time of the organization of the Association that they
had acquired no title to the water system from the Developer or Bateman and that he had not promised to
convey the water system to the plaintiff Association~
The sole evidence admitted in the record which
would sustain a finding by the Court that plaintiff is
entitled to a cmweyance of the water system was contained in Exhibit 15. Exhibit 15 purports to be a contract between plaintiff and dfendant dated .l\Iay 22,
1963. Paragraph 6 of Exhibit 15 state as follows:
"6. At such time as Associates acquire title to
the water rights and water system including
tanks and equipment and right-of-ways pertaining thereto, that it will transfer said rights,
system, tanks, equipment and right-of-ways to
the Association, which Association then agrees
to assume full responsibility in connection with
the maintenance, development and operation of
such water system."
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
the Lower Court found Exhibit 15 to be a binding con-
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tract (R. 101). Defendant urges that this finding of
the Court ancl the additional findings which are incidental thereto were erro11eous for the following reasons:
The m1contrm'ertecl evidence showed that all
elements of a hi11di11g contract 1vere not present with
respect to Exhibit 15.
1.

The minutes of tlie plaintiff Association and
defendant do not !-.how that Exhibit 15 as written was
ever approved by either corporation.
2.

The conduct of the plailltiff Association after
.:\Jay 22, HH>7, is inconsistent with its claim that Exhibit
15 was a valid, hi11ding contract.
:3.

4. The plai11tiff should be estopped to assert the
validity of Exhibit 15 by reason of its admissions under
oath in Answers to Interrogatories.
These points will he argued in order.
1 1hc 1111co11trot•crtc£l ct'idencc showed that all
l'lc111c11ts of a binding contract were not present with
rcN JJcct to lt',i·hibi t l 5.
1.

Defendant alleges that the evidence shows that
Exhibit 15 was never approved by defendant and that
it was never delivered by defendant to plaintiff. Only
two witnesses testified with respect to Exhibit 1.5. That
Exhibit was introduced i11to evidence through the testi-
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mony of Kenneth L. Stahr. l\Ir. Stahr was an executive
officer of both plaintiff and defendant on l\lay 22,
Hrn3, the date Exhibit 15 was allegedly entered into.
l\Ir. Stahr was called as an adverse witness by plaintiff Association for the sole purpose of introducing Exhibit 15. l\I r. Stahr identified the signatures on Exhibit
15 as being his own (on behalf of plaintiff Association)
and 'Valton R. Farmer's (on behalf of the defendant)
( R. 2HH.) However, he testified that the Agreement
was never approved by the defendant corporation (R.
204), that it was signed by l\lr. Farmer without any
authority from the defendant corporation (R. 266, 27.5)
and denied that the Agreement was delivered to him
(on behalf of the plaintiff Association) ( R. 266.) He
also denied that the Board of Directors of Seven Associates ever authorized Farmer to deliYer the }~xhibit
to the plaintiff . Association (R. 275), and when questioned as to how the Exhibit got into the possession of
the plaintiff Association, he stated that that document
along with others had been lost by l\Ir. Farmer at a
meeting held in Farmer's cabin in the Aspen Acres Subdivision. Ile explained that Farmer had placed those
documents in a folder which he placed on top of his car
and subsequently lost when he left the area (R. 275.)

'V alton Farmer was subsequently called as a witness by the defendant. He testified that he had been a
dirctor and the treasurer of the defendant corporation,
but that he was not at the time of the trial an officer or
director of the defendant (R. 397.) He further testi-
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fiecl that at the time of the trial he had no pecumary
interest in the defendant corporation (H. 41~.)
l\I r. Farmer testified that he had signe<l the document while sitting in an attorney's office in Salt Lake
City (H. 410) but that no members of the Uoarcl of
Directors of the plaintiff .Association were present at
that time ( R. 41.) He further testified that the Board
of Directors of defendant corporation did not authorize
the delivery of Exhibit 15, but that the Uoard of Directors of defernlant corporation declined to accept the
Agreement. (R. 411, 412.) \Vhen asked if he knew
lww the document might have come into the possession
of the plaintiff .Association, he responded that at a
meeting held at the cabin on the mountainside (Aspen
Acres Subdivision), he had a portfolio of papers. During the meeting they were left on the hack of his car,
" ... arnl we came out, and when we got to Salt Lake
we couldn't find the papers. The who]e portfolio was
gone." He identified Exhibit 15 as being included in
that lost portfolio. ( H. ·H 2.) No other witness testified
with respect to Exhibit 15.
It is elementary that the mere execution of a contl'c~ct "·ithout a valid delivery thereof does not create
a binding contract. (See 17 C.J. S. p. 735, Contracts
Sedion ti-1< and cases cited therein.)

At the trial the plaintiff purposely avoided calling its own witness to introduce Exhibit 15 or testify
as to the circumstances under which Exhibit 15 came
into the possession of the plaintiff even though counsel
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for the plaintiff was admonished by the Court that a
presumption might be raised against plaintiff's position
by reason of its failure to do so. It is a well-established
rule that where relevant evidence which would properly
be part of a case is within control of the party in whose
interest it would naturally be to produce it, and he fails
to do so without satisfactory explanation, the Court may
draw an inference that such evidence would have been
unfavorable to such party. See Bowe v. Palmer, 36 U.
214, 102 Pac. 1007 (1909). See also 29 Am. Jur. 2d
p. 220 et seq, Evidence, Sections 175, et seq.
Similarly, it is the rule that where a party has the
means in his power of repudiating or explaining evidence adduced against him, the failure to do so furnishes
a strong presumption or inference that he cannot do so.
See nlamrnoth Oil Company v. United States, 275 U.S.
13, 48 S. Ct. l, 72 L. ed. 137 ( 1927).
Also, if a party knows of the existence of an available witness on a material issue, and such witness is
within his control, and if, without satisfactory explanation, he fails to call him, the Court may draw the inference that the testimony of the witness would not have
been favorable to such party. See 29 Am. Jur. 2d p.
224, Evidence, Sec. 180, and cases cited therein.
It has been held within the meaning of the foreO'Oino·
rule , that the failure of the corporate party to
b
b
produce testimony available through its officers or directors justifies an inference adverse to such party. See
Sullivan vs. Idaho Wholesale Company, 43 Ida. 149,
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2..J.fl Pac. 8!)5 (I H2o), together with cases collected m

an .A11notation in

;j()

.A LH 2d !>07. Section .').

l 11 this matter it shoul<l he obvious that the plaintiff had available to it some witness, probably an officer
or director, who could testify as to the circumstances
under which it obtained possession of Exhibit 15.
Yet plain ti ff made no attempt to controvert the
testimony of witnesses Stahr awl Farmer that the
document had 11evcr been deli,·ered, evu1 though plaintiff \\·as put on notice in the opening statement of defe11da11t that de f'endant's witnesses would testify that
the dm_·11me11t hall been lost aIHl ne,·er deli,·erecl. (H. 172,
17:3.) 1\.ecordi11gly, it should be inferred that had the
plaintiff called their witness to testify under oath, his
testimony \Wmhl have been ach·erse to the plaintiff Association; that is. that he would testify that someone
fouwl Exhibit 15 after \Yalton Farmer lost it and gave
it to the .Association. This does not amount to a valid
delivery.
Certainly the Court is not justified in finding that
Exhibit 15 is a hirnling contract against the uncontrovertecl testimony that it was never delivered to the plaintiff.

1'he 111in11t('.1; of the jJlai11tif'f A.{/sociation and
defendant do not shore that E,rhihit 15 as written •was
C"l'l'I" approt•ed b,11 either corporation.
2.

Both Ke1111eth L. Stahr aIHl 'Valton Farmer testi-
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fied that Exhibit 15 was not approved by the lfoarcl of
Directors of Seven Associates, Inc. The minute book
of SeYen Associates, luc. was introduced into evidence
(Exhibit 25) and confirms their testimony inasmuch
as none of the minutes therein show an approval of Exhibit L3. The minutes o fthe plaintiff Association (Exhibit 9) contain several minutes having a bearing on
hihit 15. The minutes of the plaintiff Association (Exor its substance. The minutes of a meeting elated May 1,
1 !Hi3, contain a resolution for an agreement which tlie
plaintiff Association proposed to Seven Associates, Inc.
However, the minutes of a subsequent meeting elated
~I ay 20, 196:J, disclose that the proposed agreement
''. . . was returned to us and i n c 1u de cl several
changes . . . . " At Jaw, this would not constitute an acceptance hut only a counter offer. The minutes of the
meeting of l\Iay 20, 1963, further disclosed that after
a considerable cliscussion, the Board of Directors of
plaintiff Association made several substantial changes
in the returned proposal which they then re-submitted
to the defendant corporation for approval. This would
constitute another counter offer. Kenneth L. Stahr
testi ficd that Exhibit 17 set· out in full the revised resolution as prepared by the plaintiff Association at their
meeting on l\lay 20, 1963, and re-submitted to defendant. (R. 272.) Exhibit 17 has a handwritten entry which
Mr. Stahr stated was written by him at the time of the
meetin<r
at the time the Uoard of Directors of Seven
b
Associates met to consider the counter-proposal from
plaintiff Association dated l\'Iay 20, 1963. (R. 273.)
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The hand-written material notes as follows: "Not approved by 7 Associates Inc. l\Ieeting l\Iay 8, 1963,
he cause of differences encountered by both sides it was
decided to drop further discussion on this particular
proposal. Kenneth Stahr, Secretary." (See Exhibit 17.)

It should also be noted that the resolution finally

approved hy the plaintiff Association on l\Iay 20, 1963,
only resembles Exhibit 15 in some parts and there is no
other minute entry any where in the records of the
plaintiff Association which indicates that Exhibit 15
itself was ever considered and approved by the Board
of Directors of the plaintiff Association.
3. 'l'hc conduct of the plaintiff Association after
1llay 22, 19t>7, iN i11co11,11istc11t tcith its claim that E<d1ibit
15 was a 'l'alid, binding contract.

Several of the minutes of the plaintiff Association (Exhibit 9) an<l written proposals of plaintiff Association to defendant following l\Iay 22, 19()3, constitute a recognition that the plaintiff Association did not
feel it had acquired any rights in the water system as
of l\Iay 22, 190:3. The minutes of the meeting held November 17, l9HH (Exhibit 9) recite that the Board of
Directors of the plaintiff Association apprO\'ed an agreement prepared by Frank Allen for the plaintiff Association. This Agreement was introduced into evidence as
Exhibit 8. The whole purpose of the proposed agreement was to obtain the consent of the defendant for the
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plaintiff to exercise certain acts of control over the
water system.
Sec also the minutes of l\Iay 3, 1!)()7, (Exhibit 9)
in which Paul Carpenter advised all members of the
Association in a general meeting" ... that a good working arrangement was neeclecl on a sound legal basis between Aspen .Acres Association who owns the water
rights, awl the Seven Associates, who may have the
ownership of the system." He further reported that attorneys for the plaintiff and the defendant were
" ... working up an agreement to be approYed by ti,rr
Board of Directors of each company." (Emphasis added.) This is patently inconsistent with the plaintiff's
claim that it alread,11 had an agreement (i.e. Exhibit 15).
4. The plaintiff should be estoppcd to assert the
validity of E,rliibit 15 by reason of its admissions under
oath in A nswcrs to I11terrogatorics.

On .May 28, 1971, defendant, through its counsel,
se1Tecl upon plaintiff, through its counsel, a Request
for Admissions and Interrogatories. In the Interrogatories, clefenclant asked whether the plaintiff has entered
into any written agreements with Aspen Acres, Inc. or
with l\Iax Bateman as an individual, or with the heirs
and successors in interest of l\Iax Bateman (other than
the agreement by which the water rights were transferred to plaintiff.) Defendant requested (if that interrogatory be answered in the affirmative) that the
plaintiff identify such other written agreements. Plain-
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tiff answered that interrogatory on July 22, 1971, as
follows: "Plaintiff is aware of no other written instrument entitled "Agreement" executed by both plaintiff
and, either Bateman, or the def cndant, or any other heirs
or successors in interest of ~Iax Bateman." (R. 59.)
(Emphasis added.)
In response to defendant's request to identify any
other written agreements, the plaintiff did identify
some written instruments (none of which were agreenmts) which it intended to rely upon, hut failed to
identify the alleged agreement which was later introduced into evidence as Exhibit 15. (R ..59.) Defendant
was not informed of the existence of Exhibit 15 until
the night hefore the trial. All of this was explained to
the Trial Court in chambers by the attorneys for plaintiff and defendant at the conunencement of the trial,
and alluded to in defendant's opening statement. (R.
172.)

Consequently, the state of the record before this
Court is:
(a) The uncontroverted testimony of
the only witnesses who testified about Exhibit
15 is to the effect that the agreement was
never in fact delivered to the plaintiff Association, but rather it was lost and apparently
found by someone ·who delivered it to the
plaintiff Association.
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( b) That the minute hooks of both
plaintiff and defendant disclose that the agreement was never apprm·ed hy either corporation.
( c) That the conduct of the parties, and
particularly the plaintiff Association after
.JUay 22, 19G:3, was inconsistent with plaintiff's
claim that Exhibit 15 was valid and binding
upon the parties.
( d) That the plaintiff under oath denied the existence of any agreement such as
Exhibit rn between plaintiff and defendant.
( e) Finally, that the plaintiff failed to
explain how Exhibit 15 came into its possession under circumstances which should raise an
inference against the position of the plaintiff
Association.
In view of the foregoing, there is no evidence in
the record to sustain the finding of the Trial Court that
Exhibit 15 was a valid and enforceable agreement.
There was no other evidence before the Court which
would justify the judgment awarding ownership of the
water system to the plaintiff corporation and ordering
defendants to convey the water system and its appurtenant parts to the plaintiff Association or restraining
th~ defendant from making any attachments or modifications to its own system.
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In view of the evidence, the Court should have enterecl its order awarding ownership of the water system
to the defendant, awl the only restraint the Court should
have put upon the right of the defendant to modify or
extend the system should be that no such modifications
or extensions should he made which would unreasonably
interfere with the delivery of water to the members of
the plaintiff Association.

POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN
UJL\XTINC~
TIIE PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION TIIE RIGIIT TO CONTROL THE
E.ASEl\IENTS 'VITlIIN AND 'VITIIOUT
THE SUBDIYISION, AND IN }'AILING TO
GlL\NT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN
EASEMENT ACROSS TIIE ROADS WITHIN
TIIE SUBDIVISION FOR ACCESS TO ITS
LANDS O'VNED llY DEFENDANT.
This point will he argued in two division as follows:
(a) The Court erred in granting the plaintiff
Association the right to control easements within and
without the subdivision.
( b) The Court erred in failing to recognize the
defendant's right to an easement across the roads within
the subdivision for access to said lands.

The Court erred in granting the plaintiff Association the right tr,; control the easements within and
without the subdivision.
(a)
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The Court in its judgment recognized an easement
m favor " ... of the members of plaintiff association
and all lot owners in now or hereafter subdivided
areas .... " across the roadway leading from the public
highway into the subdivided areas. This point was never
and is not now contested by defendant which has never
sought to restrict or limit this right.
However, in paragraph two of the Judgment, the
Court also stated:
"'Vith reference to said easement and as trustee
for said lot owners, plaintiff has the following rights:

* * * * *

"(h) The right to make reasonable regulations governing the kinds of vehicles and loads
permitted upon the road and restricting access
to owners of land within the tract and their
invitees.
" ( c) The right to erect and maintain access
control devices at the highway in the implementation of reasonable regulations governing
nccess control."
The right to control access to these easements was
granted to the plaintiff Association even though the
uncontroverted evidence before the Court demonstrates
that the plaintiff Association represents only the owners of 111 lots out of a total of 161 lots in the subdi-
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vision which existed

05.)

011

September 12, 19{)2. (See R. t>l-

The Court erroneously, we believe, took the position that the right of the plaintiff Association flowed
from the Developer because of the activities of _Max
Bateman in connection with the organization of the
plaintiff Association. Yet, all of the evidence introduced
with respect to the organization of the plaintiff Association showed that J\lax Bateman and his personal attorney, David Salisbury (rather than the corporate attorney Reed Tuft who also was a 50% owner of the
Developer corporation) were the ones who fostered the
organization of the plaintiff Association. No evidence
"as introduced indicating that the Developer corporation (as opposed to .:\lax Bateman iw1ividually) organized the plaintiff .Association. Furthermore, it is apparent from the record that as of September 12, 1962,
the date of the organization of the plaintiff Association, a substantial number of lots had been sold and less
than 50% of the lot owners chose to join the plaintiff
J\ ssociation. (See :Exhibit 9 -- J\linutes of General
J\lemhership l\Ieeting held September 26, 1962, wherein it was stated: "The next item of business concerned
finances. The secretary advised that the paid-up membership to date was less than 50% of the potential."
(Emphasis added.) Also, compare the Articles of Incorporation of plaintiff Association contained in Exhibit 9 which bear the signatures of forty-eight lot owners as original incorporators.)
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Defendant respectfully submits that the plaintiff
Association is actually a voluntary association of some
hut by no means all of the lot owners in the subdivision.
In Answers to Interrogatories, plaintiff Association
admitted that it had not obtained any right to control
the access from the owners of lots who were not members of the plaintiff Association (R. 6~5, 66.) Conseq11cntly, the rights of the plaintiff Association are not
greater than the rights of its members, and they are the
only ones the Association has the right to represent ..
Actually, however, all owners of property withi11
the one-half section tract known as "Aspen Acres" are
owners in common of all of the easements created within the tract. The Jaw in Utah and elsewhere is wellestablishe<l that an owner in common of an easement
cannot make alterations which will render the easement
appreciably less convenient and useful to any of its cotenants. See Hig Cottonwood 1.1anncr Ditch Company
ti.

1lloyle, 109 U. 213, 174 P.2d 148, 172 A.L.R. 175

(194G).

Accordingly, neither the lot owners who are members of the Association (including the plaintiff as their
representative) nor the lot owners who are not members
of the Association nor the defendant as co-tenants of
the easement in question could control or restrict the use
of the easement by others, except by mutual consent of
all.
Defendant would not object to the construction of
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a gate or other device to control or restrict the access
upon the terms mutually agreeable to all property owners within the tract. Defendant does, however, object
to the unilateral exercise of control upon terms determined solely by the Association. The record discloses
that other property owners (non-members of the plaintiff Association) have also objected to the manner in
",:hich the Association has restricted access. (R. 335.)
Since the members of the Association individually
could not take it upon themselYes to restrict the access
of the other property owners, the Association should not
be permitted to do so by its unilateral determination and
the Lower Court committed error in granting this right
to the Association.

1 1 he Court erred in failing to grant defendant
an casement across the roads in the subdivision.
(b)

Exhibit 1 is a drawing showing the one-half section
tract which is the subject of this suit. Exhibit 1 shows
the roads within the subdivision as well as those giving
access to the subdivision and those which lie beyond the
subdivision. Exhibit 1 also shows by the area in blue
the lands owned by the defendant corporation. As will
he seen from Exhibit 1, the defendant corporation owns
lands which are cut off from the public highway by the
lands comprising the subdivision. Consequently, defendant sought in its counter-claim to have the Court
award it an easement for access to and from its properties. (R. 19 Paragraph 8 (2) .) In post-trial memo-
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randum, plaintiff conceded the defendant's right to
use of the roads within the subdivision for access. (R.
116.) The Lower Court in its Judgment, however, failed
to make any decision with respect to this issue.
Defendant contends that it is entitled to an easement across the roads in the subdivision for access to
the lands lying beyond the subdivision upon either of
two theories:
(a) That defendant is entitled to an easement
created by express reservation, or
(b) Defendant is entitled to an easement by implication.
That defendant is entitled to an easement
created by e.vpress reservation.
(a)

As stated previously, the real estate contracts by
which lots were sold within the subdivision contained an
express reservation of an easement" ... for the use and
benefit of any person now owning or who 1nay acquire
property in the tract known as Aspen Acres.'' (Exhibits
10, 18, 19, 28) (Emphasis added.)
Defendant respectfully contends that the foregoing wording is sufficient to include the developer at
that time and the defendant corporation which purchased the same property from the Developer.
(b)
cation.

Defendant is entitled to an easement by impli-
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The general law as well as the law in Utah recoO'·
0
nize the creation of the way of necessity under certain
conditions. A way of necessity is an easement f ouncled
upon an implied grant or reservation of the easement.
It arises where there is a conveyance of a part of a tract
of land of such nature and extent that either the part
conveyed or the part retained is shut off from access
to a road to the outer world by the land from which it
is served or by this land and the land of stranger.
Under such circumstances there is an implied grant or
rese1Tation of an easement across the land conveyed or
retained. See Sm•age v. Nielsen, 114 U. 22, 197 P.2d 117
( 1948) . The requirements to establish a way of necessity are two-fold:
Showing that the dominant and senient estates
were under common ownership at sometime, and
I.

2. That the servient estate was severed from the
dominant estate in such manner as to cut off the access
of the dominant estate of the road. (See 25 Am. Jur.
tel pp. 448-50, Easements, Section 35.)
'fhe uncontroverted evidence in this case discloses
that the whole one-half section tract was under the ownership of Aspen Acres, Inc., the Developer corporation,
arnl that said Developer corporntion developed the subdivided areas. Exhibit l further demonstrates that the
subdivided areas completely close off the access to the
lands lying beyond the subdivision.
Accordingly, defendant respectfully contends that
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it is entitled to an easement over the roads within the
subdivision for access to its lands lying beyond the subdivision either because the defendant is included within
the express reservation contained in the real estate contracts or by the implied reservation of an easement by
necessity.

POINT III. THE. COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING TI-I AT DEI<"'ENDANT :MUST
GUARANTEE THE DUTIES \iVHICH THE
PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION OWES TO ITS
~IElHBERS, AND IN ESTOPPING DEFENDANT FRO.M DENYING THAT THE PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION IS ITS AGENT.
In the }-.indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
the Court found:
"The Association was sponsored
Developer and many, but not all, of
owners. The Developer has delegated
Association certain rights with the
duties ... (R. 98.)

by the
the lot
to said
related

"The Association acquires duties of maintenance of easements for the ingress and egress
and for water lines as lot owners come into
existence . . . . (R. 99.)
" ... The Seven Associates has the duties
of the developer created by all its dealings with
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lot owners and those d cl egated to the A ssociation . ... It also has a <luty to each lot owner
to whom it sells to guarantee performance hy
the Association of its duties. ( R. 100.) (Emphasis added.)
"The Developer has the <luty to maintain
the roads and water service, although by contract, the Association has acquired the same
duty.

"Set·cn Associates are liable for all of
Developer's duties owed to the lot owners. (R.
l 01.) (Emphasis added.)
"Developer and Seven Associates are
estopped from denying that the reasonable activities of the Association are the acts of the
Developer and Seven Associates. This constitutes an agency." (R. 101.)
Defe11dant contends that these findings are contrary to the law and the evidence in this case. For clarity, these matters will he argued under two headings:
(a) The Court erred in finding that defendant is
a guarantor of the duties of the Association to its members or other lot owners, and
( b) The Court erred in finding that the defendant is estopped from denying the plaintiff Association
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is its agent and that the reasonable activities of the
plaintiff Association are its acts.
The Court erred in finding that def endant i.v
a guarantor of the duties of the Association to its members or other lot owners.
(a)

The plaintiff Association was incorporated on September 12, 19C2. The defendant corporation was incorporated in l\Iareh of 1963, and its first dealings with the
Developer were the negotiation and consumation of the
contract of sale on l\larch 27, 1!)63. (Exhibit 16.) By
the terms of Exhibit 16, defendant agreed to purchase
from the Developer certain real property which amounted to eighteen specific lots within the subdivided area,
plus the undeveloped land in the half section tract then
owned by the Developer. An examination of that Exhibit will disclose that the defendant corporation did
not agree to assume any of the responsibilities of the
Developer toward the plaintiff Association or toward
other lots or lot owners other than the responsibility to
run a water line to fifteen lots which were specifically
identified in the agreement, four of which were being
purchased by the defendant under the terms of the same
contract.
The Court apparently assumed that by the terms
of Exhibit 16, defendant purchased all of the rights
and liabilities of the Developer arising out of its prior
dealings with land not being purchased by the defendant
(i.e. lots previously sold to others). Yet, there is nothing in the contract or in the other evidence presented in
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the trial which indicates that the defendant agreed to
assume any other responsibilities.
For all that appears in the contract or in the evidence, the defendant was in exactly the same position
as the other lot owners in that the defendant also purchased lots from the Developer (as well as purchasing
the undeveloped areas in the one-half section tract
:>wnecl by the Developer). If this contract imposes upon
the defendant the burden of assuming all of the obligations of the Developer toward lot owners who previously purchased lots from the Developer, then it would
follow that all of the other lot owners assumed similar
obligations with respect to each lot owner previously
purchasing a lot from the Developer. Similarly, it would
also follow rea<;onably that the same obligation should
be incurred by everyone who subsequently purchases a
lot either from the <lefendaut or from any of the other
lot owners.
The policy of the law, of course, is against imposing secret obligations on purchasers of real estate. This
should more especially be the case where, as here, the
obli()'ations
are not clearly• defined and may be subject
b
to enlargement as new situations arise not contemplated
at the time of the transfer of property.
Defendant does not object to standing behind any
obligations which it specifically undertakes by contracts
or deed with lot owners purchasing their lot from defendant. However, defendant does object to the imposi-
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tion by the Court upon the defendant of any obligations undertaken by the Developer in its contracts, particularly where no evidence was presented showing that
the defendant succeeded to the rights of the Developer
with respect to the lots sold by the Developer to other
lot owners.
The uncontroverted evidence which was presented
by witnesses for plaintiff shows that the purpose of the
formation of the plaintiff Association was so that the
plaintiff Association could take over the road maintenance and water rights and other duties theretofore performed by .Max Bateman.
Therefore, the proper holding should be that the
plaintiff Association (and not the defendant) became
the guarantor of the duties of .Max I-Jateman or the Developer with respect to the lot owners purchasing the
lots from Bateman or the Developer. The defendant
corporation should be put in that position if at all, only
with respect to any duties specifically assumed by it on
behalf of lot owners purchasing from the defendant.
(b) The C01irt erred in finding that the def endant is estopped from denying the plaintiff Association
is its agent and that the reasonable activities of the plaintiff Association arc its acts.

The finding by the Lower Court in the instant case
that the defendant was estopped from denying the plaintiff Association is its agent, is beyond the issues raise<l
by the pleadings and is totally unsupported by an evi-
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dence. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Public
Utilities Commission v. Jones, .54 U. Ill, 179, Pac. 754
( l!H n), defined estoppel as relating to a situation where
"A person is held to a representation made, or a position
assumed, where otherwise inequitable consequences
would result to another who, having the right to do so
under all the circumstances of the case, has, in good
faith relied thereon."

No e\ridence was presented nor was it even asserted
hy the plaintiff that the defendant had ever represented
to anyone or assumed a position consistent with the representation that the plaintiff Association was the agent
of the defendant. Furthermore, the record is totally
devoid of any evidence indicating that any inequitable
consequence would result to the Association or to anyone
else if the defendant were permitted to deny that the
plaintiff Association is its agent as opposed to being the
ngent of the lot owners "\vl10 are members of the plaintiff Association.
An examination of all of the relevant evidence in
this case will disclose that at all times the plaintiff Association has taken a position in opposition to the rights
asserted by defendant, and it has never purported to be
the a()'ent
or other re1)resentative of the defendant.
<:""'
The findings of the Court places the defendant in
the anomalous position of having an agent which it did
not appoint, which it cannot control and apparently (because of the estoppel) which it cannot terminate; yet

this "agent" consistently takes a position adverse to the
interests of the defendant.
Defendant respectfully submits that no proper purpose is served by the Court's findings because anyone
with whom defendant has dealt has a direct right of
action against defendant in the event of default or prejudicial damage.
Defendant is particularly apprehensive as to the
Court's finding that it is estopped from denying that
the reasonable activities of the plaintiff Association are
the acts of the defendant with respect to future actions
of plaintiff. This finding could obviously subject the
defendant to claims from limitless persons for liabilities
which may be created by the activities of the plaintiff.
In each instance, the sole defense of the defendant corporation would depend upon the reasonableness of the
activities of the plaintiff over which the defendant has
no control. Consequently, that finding amounts to an
arbirtrary and capricious action and an abuse of discretion by the Court. Since it is not supported by any evidence, it should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully submits that this Honorable Court should
enter its order:
Reversing the determination of the Trial Court
that the plaintiff owns the water system and its comI.
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poncnt parts and awarding the same to the defendant.
For the same reasons, the Court should reverse the determination of the Trial Court that Exhibit 15 is a valid
contract and that the defendant is restrained from makmg any attachment to or modification of the 'vater
system.
Reversing the determination of the Trial Court
awarding plaintiff the right to control the easements
situatecl within the one-half section tract known as
"Aspen Acres." This Court should also by its decision
award defendant an easement across the roads within
the su hdivision for access to its lands lying beyond the
suhdhrision.
2.

Reversing the determination of the Lower
Court that the defendant must guarantee the duties
which the plaintiff owes to its members and other lot
owners and also reverse the determination of the Trial
Court that the defendant is estopped from denying that
plaintiff is its agent and that the reasonable activities
of the plaintiff are the acts of the defendant.
3.
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